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Abstract:	 A	 review	 of	 current	 earthquake-prone	 building	 policy	 undertaken	 by	 the	New	 Zealand	Ministry	 of	
Building,	Innovation	and	Enterprise	(MBIE)	following	the	Christchurch	earthquake,	resulted	in	the	Government	
introducing	 legislation	to	strengthen	structural	requirements	for	all	earthquake-prone	building	to	a	minimum	
of	 35%	 of	 the	 New	 Building	 Standard	 and	 within	 a	 time	 period	 of	 15	 years,	 and	 irrespective	 of	 a	 building	
location’s	seismic	risk	zone.	The	outcry	against	the	original	legislation	led	Parliament’s	Local	Government	and	
Environment	 Committee	 to	 change	 aspects	 of	 the	 Bill	 and	 call	 for	 re-submissions	 from	 the	 public	 on	 their	
appropriateness.		
This	 paper	will	 scrutinize	 these	 re-submissions	 and	outline	 the	 significant	 changes	 subsequently	made	 to	
the	Bill	as	a	result	of	this		“community	feedback”.	It	will	compare	the	resultant	legislation	with	those	countries	
of	 similar	earthquake	 risk,	 specifically	 Japan	and	parts	of	 the	USA	 (California),	and	 investigate	 the	effect	 this	
new	 and	 revised	 legislation	 will	 have	 in	 the	 continued	 life	 of	 the	 small	 earthquake	 prone	 “home	 shop”	
unreinforced	masonry	buildings	 that	make	up	a	 significant	proportion	of	 the	urban	 fabric	of	 the	many	 small	
towns	and	suburban	communities	within	New	Zealand.		
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1.	Introduction		
Seismic	retrofitting	of	existing	buildings	remains	a	complex	and	often	politically	difficult	area	for	governmental	
authorities.	 Issues	of	heritage,	construction	complexity,	social	upheaval	and	financial	considerations	 including	
loss	of	rental	income,	can	put	the	building	owner	to	considerable	 disadvantage	 and	 threaten	 the	 commercial	
viability	 of	 any	 retrofit	 project.	 This	disruption	 has	 to	 be	 balanced	 against	 the	 advantages	 of	 building	
stock	 more	 resistant	 to	earthquake	damage,	and	hence	a	safer	social	environment	for	citizens.	
Fardis	 (1998)	 acknowledges	 the	 major	 threat	 to	 human	 life	 comes	 from	 existing	 (older)	buildings,	
however	he	 asserts	 the	 emphasis	 of	 earthquake	 engineering	 research	 and	 of	 code	writing	 efforts	 has	
been,	 and	 still	 is,	 on	 new	 construction.	 The	 reason:	 the	 redesign	 of	 an	 existing	 structure	 is	 a	 much	 more	
complex	 and	 technically	 demanding	 task	 than	 earthquake	 resistant	 design	 of	 a	 new	 structure.	 Issues	 of	
history	and	culture,	building	activity	and	heritage	 influence	 legislation.	Adding	to	 these	 factors	 is	 the	 issue	of	
cost,	 which	 inevitably	means,	 “..the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 building	 inventory	 in	 seismic	 regions	 worldwide	 is	
[and	remains}	by	 and	 large	 substandard	 and	 seismically	 deficient	 in	 the	 light	 of	 our	 current	 knowledge”.	
Upgrading	within	a	jurisdiction	remains	a	fine	balancing	act	between	a	desirable	outcome	and	the	unintended	
consequences	of	too	severe	an	imposed	timeframe	(Fardis,	1998).		
A	2006	OECD	report	suggests	 poor	 seismic	 retrofit	 outcomes	 can	also	originate	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 shared	
responsibility	between	 national	 and	 local	 government,	 or	 governments	 and	 citizens,	 combined	 with	 weak	
incentives	to	undertake	the	work	(OECD,	2006	p.27).	Spence	 (2004)	suggests	a	 lack	of	 financial	incentive	 is	 a	
consideration.	Given	that	 the	cost	of	seismic	retrofit	varies	 from	5-50%	of	 the	total	 rebuilding	 cost	 and	 with	
the	 return	 period	 of	 major	 earthquakes	 one	 hundred	 years	 or	more,	 there	 is	 “..small	 incentive	 for	 the	
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building	 owner	 to	 make	 the	 investment	 worthwhile”	 (Spence,	2004,	p.223).	Wilkinson	et	 al	 (2011)	 suggest	
building	owners	also	lack	trust	in	the ability	of	seismic	strengthening	techniques	to	perform	under	earthquake	
load. This	 lack	of	 trust	 in	 the	ability	of	design	 solutions	 to	 solve	earthquake	 issues	makes	 them	 reluctant	 to	
retrofit	and	strengthen.  
Within	 this	 challenging	 social	 context,	 the	 New	 Zealand	 Government	 has	 embarked	 on	 the	 process	 of	
reform	to	its	earthquake	legislation,	prompted	by	the	events	in	the	city	of	Christchurch,	New	Zealand’s	second	
most	populated	city.	Here,	on	September	4th	2010,	an	 earthquake	 of	magnitude	 7.1	 struck	 the	city.	This	was	
followed	 by	 another,	 some	 6	 months	 later	 on	 February	 11th	 2011,	 this	 time	 of	 magnitude	 6.3.	 The	
February	 earthquake	 caused	 extensive	 damage	 across	 the	 city	 and	was	responsible	 for	 the	deaths	of	some	
185	 people,	 mostly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 building	 collapse.	 The	 deliberations	 of	 The	Canterbury	Earthquake	Royal	
Commission,	 assembled	to	 examine	 the	 reasons	 for	 these	 collapsed	 buildings,	concluded	with	 a	 range	 of	
recommendations	 designed	 to	 improve	 the	 response	 of	 the	 nation	 to	 another	 future	 earthquake.	 These	
recommendations	led	to	the	introduction	to	the	New	 Zealand	 Parliament	 of	 The	 Building	 (Earthquake-prone	
Buildings)	 Amendment	 Bill	 2013,	 an	 amendment	 to	 the	 Building	 Act	 2004,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 improving	
methods	 of	managing	New	Zealand’s	stock	of	earthquake-prone	buildings	(Figure	1). 
 
 
Figure	1	(Source:	Author)	
2.	Background:	Current	earthquake	policy		
The	 seismic	 performance	 of	 existing	 buildings	 in	 New	 Zealand	 is	managed	 through	 the	Building	 Act,	
first	 and	 foremost	 the	 original	 Act	 of	 1991,	 and	 latterly	 its	 successor,	 the	Building	Act	 2004.	 The	New	
Zealand	Building	Code,	which	contains	 the	 regulations	 under	the	 Act,	 is	 a	 Performance	 Based	 Code,	 and	
marks	 a	 move	 away	 form	 the	 prescriptive	standards	 based	 building	 codes	 common	 to	 New	 Zealand	 in	
the	 past.	 The	 performance-based	 regulation	 “establishes	 mandatory	 goals	 rather	 than	 enforcing	
prescriptive	 standards”	 and	 potentially	 offers	 the	 opportunity	 of	 achieving	 health,	 safety	 and	
environmental	 outcomes	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 promoting	 innovation	 and	 reducing	 regulatory	 cost	
(Mumford,	2010).	
The	 path	 to	 an	 effective	 functioning	 performance-based	 system	 is	 not	 necessarily	 straight	forward,	
as	 the	New	 Zealand	 system	has	 aptly	 demonstrated.	 The	 period	 of	 greatest	 building	failure	(in	the	form	of	
leaking	buildings)	took	place	subsequent	to	the	introduction	of	the	1991	Act,	with	the	long	road	to	remedial	
action	 beginning	 with	 the	 replacement	 2004	 Building	 Act,	 a	 more	 conservative	 and	 document	 (Murphy,	
2011).	That	aside,	the	move	to	performance-based	regulations	 is	still	expected	in	the	long	term	to	“alleviate	
the	 existence	 of	 requirements	 that	 are	 too	 complex	 and	 prescriptive,	 and	 a	 system	 unresponsive	 to	
technological	change	and	innovation”	(BIA,	1990).	
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Prior	 to	 the	 1991	 Building	 Act,	 the	 only	 national	 requirement	 for	 existing	 buildings	 was	 an	 Act	 of	
Parliament	 that	 required	 existing	 buildings	 unable	 to	 resist	 ½	 of	 the	 forces	 of	 the	 1965	 Code	 to	 be	
strengthened.	 These	 forces	 were	 evidently	 very	 low	 and	 hence	 resulted	 in	 very	 few	 seismic	 refits.	 A	
voluntary	 program	 in	 the	 capital	 city	 Wellington	 (a	 high	 risk	 earthquake	zone)	 resulted	 in	 the	 1970s	of	
retrofit	or	demolition	of	 about	60%	of	 the	older	building	 stock.	The	current	regulatory	system	prior	 to	 the	
advent	 of	 this	 new	 legislation	 devolved	 much	 of	 the	 decision	 making	 to	 local	 authorities,	 with	 central	
government	 having	 a	 limited	 role	 in	 oversight	 and	 monitoring.	 Up	 until	 the	Christchurch	 earthquake	 this	
process	 resulted	 in	 very	 few	 retrofits.	 The	 Christchurch	earthquake	 of	 2011	 and	 the	 damage	 to	 existing	
buildings	 (including	 several	 “modern”	buildings)	 that	 resulted	 from	 it	provided	 the	 impetus	 for	a	 review	 in	
earthquake	policy.	
As	 noted,	 giving	 emphasis	 to	 the	 need	 for	 a	 review	 was	 The	 Canterbury	 Earthquake	 Royal	
Commission’s	 report	 on	 the	 Christchurch	 earthquake.	 The	 main	 recommendations	 for	 change	
included	 the	 creation	 of	 additional	 legislation	 to	 empower	 local	 authorities	 to	 ensure	 “timely	
improvements”	 in	 the	 strengthening	 of	 existing	 earthquake-prone	 URM	 buildings	 within	 their	 area	 of	
jurisdiction,	 and	 “..that	 the	 maximum	 time	 permitted	 to	 complete	 the	 evaluation	 and	 strengthening	 of	
existing	buildings	 should	be	set	 nationally.”	TA	problem	with	this	was	that	the	TAs	lacked	any	comprehensive	
catalogue	 of	 earthquake	 buildings.	 The	 MBIE	 suggested	 in	 its	 Consultative	 Document	 that	 some	 15000-
25000	 buildings	 would	 fall	 into	 the	 earthquake-prone	 category.	 This	 figure	 was	 as	 a	 very	 broad	
estimate,	 as	 only	 a	 few	 local	authorities	“can	provide	good	data”	(MBIE,	2012,	p.6).	
Of	the	66	local	authorities,	only	23	were	able	to	provide	any	information	on	the	number	 of	
earthquake-prone	 buildings	 in	 their	 districts,	 and	 much	 of	 the	 information	 received	was	
incomplete	(MBIE,	2012,	p.12).	
	The	 Commission	 also	 recommended	 structural	 engineer	 skills	 in	 this	 area	 be	 improved	 and	 that	 a	
grading	 system	 be	 developed,	 capable	 of	 being	 understood	 by	 the	 general	 public,	 that	 adequately	
described	 the	 seismic	 performance	 of	 a	 building.	 Other	 recommendations	 of	 a	more	 detailed	 nature	 gave	
advice	 on	 the	 degree	 of	 strengthening	 required.	 In	 general	 terms,	 to	 protect	 life	 safety,	 the	 Commission	
suggested	 the	 “shaking	 level”	 for	 these	 existing	 buildings	 be	 set	 at	 no	 less	 than	 “one	 third	 of	 the	
requirements	 for	 a	 new	 building.	 Where	 however	elements	 of	 URM	 posed	 a	 particular	 threat	 to	 health	
and	 safety,	 that	 is,	 elements	 such	 as	 parapets,	 ornaments	 and	 external	 walls,	 that	 a	 higher	 level	 of	
protection	would	be	warranted.	
The	Commission	acknowledged	some	URM	buildings	were	of	historical	 importance	but	was	of	 the	 view	
that	 if	 considered	 dangerous,	 and	 that	 demolition	 the	 only	 feasible	 option	 to	making	the	building	safe,	
then	 the	 building’s	 status	 within	 the	 Historic	 Places	 Act	 should	 not	 prevent	 this	 demolition	 from	 being	
carried	out	(Canterbury	Earthquake	Royal	Commission,	2012,	p7).	
3.	The	Earthquake-Prone	Buildings	Amendment	Bill	
3.1.	2013	Legislation	
The	 Government	 response	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 recommendations	 was	 to	 hold	 an	 internal	ministerial	
policy	 review.	 It	 then	 combined	 its	 own	ministry	 recommendations	with	 those	of	 The	 Commission	 and	
published	 a	 consultation	 document	 “Building	 Seismic	 Performance:	 Proposals	 to	 improve	 the	 New	
Zealand	 earthquake-prone	 building	 system:	 Consultation	 document”.	 This	 document	 outlined	 the	
proposal	options	to	improve	the	system	 for	 managing	 earthquake-prone	 buildings	 within	 New	 Zealand.	
It	 was	 released	 in	December	 2012,	 with	 submissions	 required	 on	 the	 proposals	 from	 the	 public	 by	 8th	
March	 2013. 	 The	 submissions	 were	 themselves	 analyzed	 in	 a	 subsequent	 report:	 “Building	 Seismic	
Performance:	 Proposals	 to	 improve	 the	 New	 Zealand	 earthquake-prone	 building	system:	 Summary	of	
Submissions”	(9	MBIE,	2013).	
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The	 review	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Earthquake	 legislation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 Building	
(Earthquake-prone	 Buildings)	 Amendment	 Bill	 2013	 is	 a	 move	 away	 from	 passive	 strengthening	
policies	 to	 active	 policies	 requiring	 strengthening	 upgrades	 to	 specified	 standards	 and	 within	 specified	
nationally	imposed	timeframes.	
The	legislation	as	initially	drafted	required	Territorial	Authorities	to:	
• Complete	 a	 seismic	 assessment	 of	 all	 non-residential,	 and	multi-unit,	multi-storey	residential	
buildings	in	their	areas	“within	5	years	of	the	legislation	taking	effect”	
• Enter	 the	 results	 of	 these	 assessments	 into	 a	 central	 register	 of	 earthquake	-prone	buildings	
• Ensure	 the	 buildings	 on	 this	 register	 are	 either	 strengthened	 or	 demolished	within	the	15	
year	specified	timeframe.	
• Require	 certain	 strategically	placed	 and/or	 important	 buildings	 to	 be	 strengthened	earlier	
than	the	national	time	frame.	
The	 MBIE	 document	 acknowledged	 initial	 proposals	 in	 the	 legislation	 that	 specified	 a	 uniform	
timeframe	 to	 upgrade,	 regardless	 of	 the	 risk	 zone,	 met	 considerable	 resistance	 from	 submitters.	
Concerns	 were	 expressed	 about	 the	 “one-size	 fits	 all	 approach”	 inherent	 in	 the	 legislation,	particularly	
the	nationwide	timeframe	of	15	years	for	strengthening,	regardless	of	risk.		
Whilst	 we	 agree	 with	 the	 retention	 of	 the	 current	 standard,	 the	 proposed	 timeframes	
and	 accountabilities	 appear	 too	 hard-hitting	 for	 our	 communities	 to	 absorb	 in	 any	 cost	
effective	way	(MBIE,	2013,	p.11).	
Whilst	 regional	 variation	 introduces	 complexity	 into	 legislation,	 submissions	 nevertheless	suggested	
it	 was	 important	 any	 approach	 took	 into	 account	 such	 factor	s	 as	 seismicity,	economic	 profile	 (high	
value,	 high	 rent	 versus	 low	 value	 and	 low	 rent),	 local	 heritage	 issues	 and	 the	 likely	 impact	 of	 the	
legislation	on	the	local	community.	
3.2.	The	(Re)-Submission	Process	
3.2.1.	Proposed	Changes	
To	its	credit,	the	Government’s	response	to	the	obvious	deficiencies	was	to	make	changes	and	invite	the	
initial	respondents	to	make	additional	submissions	on	the	altered	bill.	The	changes	included:		
• Reducing	the	scope	of	buildings	covered	by	the	bill,	excluding	now	such	structures	as	farm	
buildings,	retaining	walls,	fences,	monuments,	wharves,	bridges	tunnels	and	the	like.		
• Lengthening	the	time	frames	for	identification	and	remediation	by	categorizing	New	Zealand	
into	three	areas	of	high,	medium	and	low	seismic	risk	(by	reference	to	the	seismic	hazard	
factor	(Z	factor).	
• Requiring	TAs	to	identify	and	assess	only	potentially	earthquake-prone	buildings	within	their	
jurisdiction	(not	all	buildings	as	per	the	previous	drafted	legislation).	This	was	required	within	
a	selected	timeframes	of	up	to	15	years,	again	depending	upon	seismic	risk.	Building	thus	
identified	would	require	registering	on	an	earthquake-prone	buildings	register.	
• Linking	the	remediation	times	for	building	strengthening	to	three	seismic	risk	areas:	
High=15years;	Medium	25years;	Low=	35years	–as	against	the	sole	time		of	15	years,	
regardless	of	seismic	area,	operative	with	the	previously	drafted	legislation.	
• Defining	priority	buildings	such	as	hospitals,	school	buildings,	emergency	service	facilities	such	
as	fire	stations,	police	stations	and	corridor	buildings	(building	close	to	strategic	access	ways).		
Remediation	for	such	buildings	was	to	be	half	the	timeframe	of	the	seismic	zone.		
Provisions	of	the	bill	that	were	to	remain	largely	unchanged	include		
• Exemption	to	remediate	when	the	risk	is	assessed	as	very	low.	
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• An	extra	10	years	to	remediate	for	Category	1	listed	historic	places	that	are	earthquake-prone.	
• Authority	for	a	TA	(on	a	case	by	case	basis)	to	grant	building	consent	for	an	upgrade	without	
requiring	upgrades	to	the	means	of	escape	from	fire	and	access	and	facilities	for	persons	with	
disabilities.		
3.2.2.	2015	Re-submissions		
A	Total	of	121	submissions	were	received,	with	48	late	submissions	(23	July	2015)	specifically	
commenting	on	the	proposed	changes	put	forward	by	Cabinet.	The	stakeholder	ratios	are	as	per	Table	1.	
3.2.3.	Timespans		
A	sizable	minority	(44%)	specifically	supported	the	general	thrust	of	the	changes,	in	particular	
remediation	time	extensions	relative	to	seismic	risk,	even	though	they	may	have	had	reservations	about	
other	parts	of	the	Bill.	
The	proposed	approach	would	be	proportionate	to	risk	and	recognizes	that	for	low	risk	zones,	
buildings	would	likely	be	replaced	or	significantly	re	renovated	during	the	next	35	years	regardless	
of	earthquake	requirements,	meaning	property	owners	would	save	money	(Property	council,	
2015).			
Table	1.	Late	Submission	Breakdown	
	
Stakeholder	 Percentage	
Individual	 42%	
Building	Owners	 18%	
Local	Government	 10%	
Architects	and	Engineers	 10%	
Others	 20%	
	
3.2.4.	Priority	buildings:	
The	original	Bill	proposed	faster	time	frames	for	“priority	buildings”	regardless	of	seismic	zone.	
Amendments	proposed	These	priority	buildings	be	limited	to	hospital	and	school	buildings,	emergency	
service	facilities	(eg	police	stations)	and	corridor	buildings	and	restricted	to	areas	of	high	and	medium	
seismic	risk.		
A	number	of	submitters	(33)	suggested	shortening	the	timeframes	for	the	strengthening	of	certain	parts	
of	unreinforced	masonry	buildings	(such	protrusions	as	verandas	or	parapets)	due	to	the	hazard	such	
protrusions	posed.	The	submission	by	Ann	Brower,	a	sole	survivor	within	a	bus	destroyed	by	falling	
building	work	in	the	Christchurch	earthquake,	seem	to	find	particular	favour	with	officials,	with	her	
suggested	changes	incorporated	into	the	final	Bill.		
Government	should	create	a	separate	category	for	non-structural	unreinforced	masonry-
parapets,	gables,	and	chimneys-	because:	a.	They	are	the	cheapest	to	fix;	b.	They	are	the	first	to	
fall;	c.	They	are	the	deadliest	when	they	do	fall…	
Fixing	parapets,	gables,	and	chimneys	first	would	make	the	Bill	more	equitable	for	towns	at	lower	
earthquake	risk.	Fixing	the	most	dangerous	and	least	expensive	bits	first	might	render	
unnecessary	the	full	building	strengthening.	(Ann	Brower,	2015)	
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3.2.5.	Definition	of	earthquake-prone	
Most	Territorial	Authorities	supported	the	definition	of	earthquake-prone	as	being	a	percentage	less	
than	35%	of	the	New	Building	Standard.	A	range	of	Engineering	organizations,	including	GNS	Science,		
and	individuals	took	exception	to	the	definition	and	asserted	any	definition	realistically	had	to	be	linked	
to	seismic	risk	and	occupancy.		
Consideration	must	be	taken	for	the	occupancy	rate	of	each	specific	building	when	determining	
its	rating	since	it	is	clearly	stated	that	the	objective	of	the	Bill	is	to	protect	people	from	injury	or	
death	from	building	failure	during	a	future	earthquake	(GNS	Science,	2015)		
Ian	Harrison’s	submission	reiterated	the	belief	outlined	in	his	original	submissions	that	the	definition	
threshold	is	overly	conservative	and	that	it	should	be	more	closely	defined	in	relation	to	a	buildings	
potential	for	collapse,	which	in	turn	links	it	to	seismic	risk.	A	building	in	Auckland	(low	risk)	is	hence	
likely	to	be	overly	strengthened	as	against	an	equivalent	building	in	Wellington,	given	the	difference	in	
risk	levels	between	the	two	centres.		
3.2.6.	Low	risk	exemptions		
This	section	did	not	arouse	much	comment,	although	GNS	Science	thought	the	now	exemptions	for	such	
structures	as	farm	buildings,	bridges,	retaining	walls	and	tunnels,	included	in	the	original	legislation,	was	
a	backward	step.	Most	were	realistic	in	their	assessment	however	that	such	structure	presented	little	
risk	to	the	public	in	the	event	of	an	earthquake.		
3.2.7.	Heritage	Issues	
Category	1	building	so	registered	under	the	Historic	Places	Act	1993	can	apply	to	the	territorial	authority	
for	extensions	of	time	for	remediation	of	up	to	10	years.	18	submitters	(including	eight	territorial	
authorities)	suggested	the	definition	of	heritage	be	widened.	This	would	have	had	implications	for	the	
typical	“home	shop”	building,	typically	of	URM	and	the	focus	of	this	paper.		Such	buildings	remain	
particularly	vulnerable	should	this	legislation	be	enacted	as	the	vast	majority	is	not,	with	few	exceptions,	
of	Category	1	heritage	status.		
3.2.8.	Upgrade	requirements	
The	 Bill	 amends	 the	 Building	 Act	 2004	 and	 enables	 Territorial	 Authorities	 to	 allow	 dispensation	 in	
certain	situations	from	the	overall	 requirement	to	upgrade	fire	and	egress	requirements,	and	access	
and	 facilities	 for	 persons	 with	 disabilities	 when	 altering	 or	 upgrading	 the	 building	 to	 comply	 with	
earthquake	strengthening	requirements.		
As	 could	 be	 expected,	 the	 discretion	 caused	 much	 comment.	 Thirty	 submitters	 supported	 the	
provision	 with	 37	 opposed.	 Supporters	 included	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 Property	 Council,	 Local	
Government	 NZ	 and	 Historic	 Places	 Aotearoa.	 Dissenters	 included	 disability	 groups,	 and	 Human	
Rights	Commission	and	several	individual	submitters.		
	
Article	 9	 of	 Convention	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	 People	 with	 Disabilities...requires	 States	 to	 take	
appropriate	 measures	 to	 ensure	 that	 disabled	 people	 have	 access,	 on	 an	 equal	 basis	 with	
others…(Human	Rights	Commission,	2015)		
	3.2.9.	Financial	incentives		
A	number	of	late	submissions	continued	to	call	for	financial	incentives	to	lessen	the	burden	on	building	
owners	required	to	remediate	their	buildings,	even	though	this	was	not	addressed	in	the	changes	to	the	
Bill.	 This	 issue	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 the	 small	 town	 low	 value	 and	 low	 rent	 “home	 shop”	 URM	
building	where	the	loan-to-value	ratios	would	all	but	rule	out	bank	finance.		
Auckland	Council	suggested	“…Government	grants	for	the	upgrade	of	structures	of	significance,	such	
as	those	of	particular	heritage	value”	and	or	that	the	“cost	of	a	seismic	retrofit	 to	be	deemed	‘repairs	
and	maintenance’	rather	than	‘capital	expenditure’	for	tax	purposes	(Auckland	Council,	2015).	
Where	 territorial	 authority	 or	 other	 government	 support	 is	 not	 forthcoming,	and	the	owner	unable	
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or	unwilling	 to	 remediate,	 then	demolition	of	 the	building,	with	 subsequent	 loss	of	 streetscape	heritage,	
remains	the	only	viable	alternative.		
4.	International	seismic	retrofit	policies		
New	 Zealand’s	 attempt	 to	 instigate	 a	 more	 active	 national	 policy	 for	 Earthquake-prone	 buildings	 can	 be	
compared	 to	 other	 earthquake	 sensitive	 jurisdictions,	 particularly	 Japan	 and	 parts	 of	 the	 United	 States,	
notably	California.	
4.1	Japan	
In	 Japan	 the	 increased	 cost	 of	 natural	 disasters,	 in	 particular	 the	 destruction	 caused	 by	 the	 Kobe	
earthquake	has	 led	to	a	revision	of	 the	building	code	to	performance-based	regulations,	a	 measure	 similar	
to	 the	 introduction	 in	 New	 Zealand	 of	 the	 national	 performance	 based	 building	 code	 in	 1991	
(Ghobarah,	 2001,	 p.878).	 The	 expectation	 is	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 these	 performance-based	
requirements	 in	 Japan	will	 assist	with	more	 flexibility	 in	 the	 area	of	 local	authority	control	and	 leave	more	
room	 for	 innovation	 in	 design	 and	material	 use.	 (Otani)	 Prior	 to	 the	Kobe	earthquake,	 seismic	 retrofit	was	
given	 low	 priority	 Japan	 with	 a	 recent	 OECD	 report	 indicating	 an	 estimated	 30%	 of	 the	 total	 building	
stock	 remain	 constructed	 according	 to	 outdated	 codes	 and	 standards	 (OECD,	 p.270).	 Whilst	 it	 is	 a	
leader	 in	 seismic	 hazard	 mitigation	 technology	 for	 new	 buildings,	 the	 national	 building	 code	 does	 not	
provide	 for	 existing	buildings,	 except	 when	 structural	members	 are	 changed	 or	 there	 are	 additions	 to	 the	
building.	Unlike	California	et	al,	there	is	also	no	code	requirement	for	strengthening	where	a	change	of	use	is	
proposed,	 and	 unlike	 the	 legislation	 currently	 proposed	 for	 New	 Zealand,	 no	 mandatory	 requirements	 to	
strengthen	or	mitigate	the	 specific	earthquake	hazards	 in	URM	building,	with	the	 decision	 to	 upgrade	 left	
to	 the	 owner,	 who	 may	 determine	 the	 seismic	 force	 level	 for	 which	 the	 retrofit	 is	 to	 be	 designed	
(Kikuchi,	1992).	
The	 introduction	 of	 the	 “Law	 Concerning	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 Improvement	 of	 Earthquake-	Resistant	
Construction”	 after	 the	 Kobe	 earthquake	 has	 also	 come,	 unlike	 New	 Zealand’s	 legislation,	 with	
supporting	 financial	 aid	 for	 seismic	 retrofit	 of	 buildings	 such	 as	 apartment	houses,	 offices	 and	 schools	
and	 later	 in	 2002,	 houses	 (Yamomoto,	 2005).	 The	 financial	 aid	 is	 modest,	 estimated	 between	 the	
range	 13-16	 percent,	 but	 combined	 with	 other	 incentives	 such	 as	reduced	housing	loans	taxation	and	
reduced	interest	rates	from	the	Housing	Loan	Corporation,	presents	 a	 monetary	 incentive	 for	 an	 owner	 to	
upgrade,	 an	 incentive	 currently	missing	 from	the	New	Zealand	legislation	(OECD,	p.28).	
4.2	California	
The	Uniform	Building	Code	 (UBC)	 operating	 in	 California	 contains	 only	one	 passive	“trigger”	 and	 no	 clear	
active	 triggers	 for	 the	 seismic	 upgrade	 of	 existing	 buildings.	 The	passive	trigger	is	a	change	of	use	in	the	
building,	 with	 discretion	 given	 to	 the	 building	 official	 to	 determine	 that	 the	 change	 of	 use	 is	 to	 a	 more	
hazardous	occupancy.	Most	cities	within	the	area	have	instigated	additional	regulations	however	that	reflect	
the	communities	concern	over	safety	 issues	 associated	with	 existing	buildings,	 especially	 those	 constructed	
in	URM.	 In	this	sense	 suggests	Hoover,	 California	 continues	 “..to	be	a	 leader	within	 the	USA	 in	 the	 field	 of	
seismic	 mitigation.”	 (California	Seismic	Safety	Commission	(CSSC),	2001,	 p.1).	 The	 active	 “triggers”	 require	
seismic	 retrofitting	 for	 certain	 building	 types,	 with	 the	 state	 mandating	 that	 the	 seismic	 hazards	 of	
unreinforced	 masonry	 buildings	 (URMs)	 in	 particular	 must	 be	 mitigated	 in	 a	 proactive	 manner,	
particularly	 in	 the	area	 of	 parapet	 hazards,	 where	 the	 parapet	 upstand	 has	 often	 deteriorated	 and	 is	
not	 well	 secured	 to	 the	 structure.	 All	 regional	 building	 codes	 offer	 a	 standard	 for	 the	 seismic	
strengthening	 of	 URM	 buildings	 –viz.	 the	 Uniform	 Code	 for	 Building	 Conservation.	 The	policy	hence	has	
similarities	 to	 the	 just	passed	 legislation	 for	URM	buildings	 in	New	 Zealand.	Unlike	 New	 Zealand	however,	
which	 is	 implementing	a	 national	 policy	with	specific	 timeframes	and	 retrofit	 requirements,	 there	 is	within	
California	 a	 wide	 variation	 in	 the	 standards	 utilized	 within	 the	 different	 cities	 making	 up	 the	 Zone	 4	
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earthquake	 area	 (the	 zone	of	 highest	 risk).	 This	 is	 an	 unfortunate	 situation	 says	 Hoover,	 resulting	 in	 “..an	
uneven	 level	of	 life	 safety	 between	 jurisdictions,	 unfair	 requirements	 of	 building	 owners,	 and	 inequitable	
economic	 competition	 between	 jurisdictions.”	 [CSSC,	 2001,	 p.2).	 There	 is	 a	 strong	 need,	 suggests	
Hoover	 (1992),	 for	 “uniform	 life	 safety	 standards	 for	 the	 assessment	 and	 retrofitting	 of	 existing	
buildings.”	 The	 New	 Zealand	 nation-wide	 policy	 of	 seismic	 retrofitting	 regulations	 for	 earthquake-prone	
buildings	would	hence	be	seen	by	Hoover	as	a	desirable	outcome	in	the	task	of	providing	minimum	life	safety	
for	building	users	in	California.	
The	 issue	 of	 compulsory	 retrofit	 within	 a	 specific	 timeframe	 remains	 a	 challenge	 in	California,	where	
for	 example,	 the	 issue	 of	 hospital	 seismic	 safety	with	 a	 specified	 timeframe,	 imposed	 by	 a	 Senate	 Bill	 in	
1994,	 comes	 up	 against	 the	 social	 consequences	 of	 demolition	and	 closure	 for	 non	 complying	 buildings	
not	 capable,	 through	 lack	of	 funds,	 of	meeting	 the	requirement	 to	 “survive	earthquakes	without	 collapsing	
or	 posing	 a	 threat	 of	 significant	 loss	 of	 life.”	 (CSSC,	 p.2).	 In	 these	 more	 urgent	 cases	 the	
recommendation	 is	 for	 public	 funding	 for	genuine	 hardship,	 but	 with	 a	 recommendation	 “to	 encourage	
new	 construction	 over	retrofitting.”	(CSSC,	p.5).	
4.3.	Other	earthquake	jurisdictions	within	the	USA 
Most	 other	 states	 adopt	 the	 Uniform	 Building	 Code	 (UBC)	 as	 the	 core	 state	 code,	 with	 many	 adding	
additional	and	different	requirements	beyond	the	sole	UBC	“change	of	use”	trigger	for	seismically	retrofitting	
existing	buildings.	Utah	 for	example,	home	to	 the	Wasatch	fault	has,	within	the	city	of	Odgen,	an	ordinance	
requiring	braces	and	wall	 anchorage	 for	URM	parapets,	 was	 well	 as	 snow	 load	 analysis,	 whenever	 a	 URM	
building	 is	 reroofed	 (Reaveley,	1992).	Other	jurisdictions	have	equally	unique	variations.	Washington,	whilst	
it	adopts	the	UBC	as	its	state	code,	requires	a	structural	retrofit	if	there	is	extensive	structural	repair,	a	major	
re-modeling	 to	extend	 the	 life	 of	 the	 building,	 a	 change	 in	 occupancy	 to	 a	 more	 hazardous	 use	 or	 has	
been	vacant	for	more	than	a	year	(Hoover,	1992,	p.72).	
 5. Conclusion 
The	 seismic	 retrofit	 performance	 of	 existing	 building	 can	 be	 a	 vexing	 one	 for	 countries	 prone	 to	
earthquakes.	New	Zealand	is	no	exception.	
	
Policy	makers,	suggest	Fardis,	hope	that	the	problem	of	substandard	existing	buildings	will	be	solved	 by	
gradual	 attrition.	 The	 reality	 is	 that	 to	 bring	 these	 buildings	 up	 to	 the	 standard	 of	new	construction	is	very	
difficult	 and	 hence	 very	 expensive.	 Fardis	 suggests	 the	 trend	 is	 hence	 to	 accept	 “significantly	 lower	
performance	requirements	of	existing	or	rehabilitated	buildings,	relative	 to	 those	 implicit	 in	 current	 codes	
for	 new	 buildings.”	 The	 basis	 of	 this	 pragmatic	attitude	 is	 not	 the	 presumably	 shorter	 remaining	 service	
life	 of	 an	 existing	 building	 but	 the	recognition	 of	 the	 “higher	 cost	 of	 seismic	 retrofitting	 in	 comparison	 to	
new	construction.”	 (Fardis,	p.131).	
	
The	 OCED	 report	 suggests	 retrofitting	 should	 be	 encouraged	with	 “a	mix	 of	 regulatory	 obligations,	
incentives	 and	 support	 through	 public	 funds.”	Whilst	 the	 benefits	 of	 retrofit	 are	evident,	 the	 process	 is	 a	
lengthy	 one	 and	 costs	 “may	 in	 some	 cases	 equal	 reconstruction.”	Research	effort	then,	suggests	the	OECD	
report	should	be	directed	towards	identifying	cheap	and	rapid	retrofitting	methods	(OECD,	p.29).	
Changes	 to	 the	Bill	 have	 eased	 the	burden	 for	 the	 small	 home	 shop	 and	 its	 owner.	 Time	 frames	have	
been	extended,	especially	for	buildings	in	medium	or	low	risk	seismic	zones.	The	TAs	role	is	less	onerous,	with	
only	potentially	earthquake-prone	buildings	requiring	identification	and	classification,	and	with	more	time	to	
achieve	this	classification.	Priority	buildings	still	have	a	shortened	time	frame	to	remediate	(half	that	of	the	
seismic	zone),	but	there	is	no	blanket	“one	off”	nationwide	time	span	now	required.	A	greater	number	of	low	
risk	 buildings	 have	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 legislation,	 lessening	 the	 burden	 on	 farmers,	
owners	 of	 non-occupied	 structures	 (such	 as	 monuments)	 and	 civil	 support	 structures	 such	 as	 bridges.	
Moderate	alterations	to	the	building	will	still	trigger	the	need	for	a	seismic	upgrade,	but	accessibility	and	fire	
egress	 requirements	 can	 be	 dispensed	 with	 (to	 the	 annoyance	 of	 some	 submitters)	 if	 the	 TA	 can	 be	
persuaded	to	agree	with	the	view	that	such	compliance	is	unreasonable.		
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The	 suggestion	 by	 Ann	 Brower	 and	 others	 for	 a	 separate	 category	 for	 non-structural	 unreinforced	
masonry	parapets,	gables	and	chimneys	within	all	buildings,	and	for	these	appendages	to	be	fixed	first,	would	
meet	the	“cheap	and	rapid	retrofitting	methods”	recommended	by	the	OECD.		
	
Fixing	the	parapets	first	would	make	the	Bill	more	equitable	for	towns	at	lower	earthquake	risk.	Fixing	the	
most	dangerous	and	 least	expensive	bits	 first	might	 render	unnecessary	 the	 full	building	 strengthening.	
…the	benefits	of	fully	retrofitting	all	9794	buildings	 in	Auckland	below	33%	of	code	are	minimal,	and	far	
outweighed	by	the	costs…If	we	fix	the	deadliest	and	cheapest	first,	we’ll	get	the	greatest	safety	bang	for	
the	retrofitting	buck	(Bower,	2015	).	
The	legislation	has	partially	accommodated	her	suggestion.	Appendages	such	as	the	veranda	and	parapet	
require	now	require	strengthening	as	a	“priority”	and	within	the	priority	time	frame,	but	only	if	the	building	is	
on	 a	 high	 use	 pedestrian	 corridor.	 The	 legislation	 still	 insists	 on	 the	 full	 strengthening	 retrofit	 to	 be	
achieved	by	the	particular	 timespan.	Here	the	New	Zealand	 legislation	differs	 from	other	 jurisdictions.	The	
element	 of	 compulsion	for	full	strengthening	to	the	34%	NBS	still	 remains,	 albeit	 to	 extended	timeframes	
that	better	reflect	the	zone	and	hence	level	of	risk.		
No	 financial	 support	 has	 been	 offered	 to	 the	 building	 owner,	 another	 OECD	 recommendation;	 yet	
there	are	considerable	penalties	for	failure	to	complete	remediation	by	the	deadline	and	a	fine	of	up	same	
amount,	 imposed	 by	 the	 TA,	 for	 failing	 to	 comply	 with	 safety	 requirements.	 Such	 an	 approach	 is	
contrary	 to	 Japanese	 policies	 and	 OECD	 recommendations	 and	 is	 likely	 to	 cause	 wholesale	
demolition	 of	 the	 small	 URM	 buildings	 in	 provincial	 areas,	 where	 values	 are	 relatively	 low	 and	
financial	 and	 insurance	 costs	 outweigh	 rental	 benefit	 likely	 from	 any	strengthening.	 	
Retrofit	 policy,	 suggests	 the	 OECD,	 needs	 to	 be	 carefully	 evaluated	 for	 its	 effectiveness.	 Passive	
policies	 may	 result	 in	 little	 change.	 More	 actively	 focused	 policies,	 such	 as	 currently	 before	 the	 New	
Zealand	 Parliament,	 may	 result	 in	 the	 wholesale	 demolition	 of	 buildings	 that	 are	 meeting	 quite	
satisfactorily	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 local	 community,	 with	 subsequent	 loss	 of	 streetscape	 heritage	 and	
cultural	value.	That	scenario	should	be	avoided	at	all	costs.		
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